This paper deals with the role institutional differences play in managerial risk-taking when engaging in international acquisitions. We assume that MNCs have different interests and capabilities when dealing with international acquisition, which in our view are significantly shaped by specific home country institutional influences. Our study concerns the question of how different forms of ownership -concentrated (e.g. 
Introduction
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) are an important and much researched aspect of corporate behaviour since they permit firms to utilize opportunities otherwise not available to them under normal operational parameters. Typically they can provide a series of benefits such as technological acquisition, market share increases, scale economies, access to distribution channels, vertical and horizontal integration and even diversification (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Trautwein, 1990) . However, since many M&As do not succeed (Sirower, 1997) there has been a tendency to seek out specific aspects of such failure rather than see it as a result of more complex integration problems. By examining the initial context and drivers of change that provide the motivation behind such strategies, it is possible to evaluate outcomes and consider the role played by institutional features of the acquiring firm's home country in the shaping of such behaviour. This is especially important when considering international activities by firms. This paper examines the role institutional differences of coordinated versus liberal market economies, and simultaneously the effect of ownership patters, play in managerial risk-taking when engaging in international acquisitions. We assume that multinational corporations (MNCs) have different interests and capabilities when dealing with international acquisitions, which are, in our view, significantly shaped by specific home country institutional influences of the acquiring firm. Our study investigates how different forms of ownership influence risk-taking and managerial decisions about international acquisitions of four major players in the global brewing industry.
The brewing industry has undergone considerable consolidation over the past decade as firms have dealt with static domestic markets, intense rivalry in key overseas markets, and opportunities for expansion in emerging markets. In the 1990s the industry changed from being primarily domestic oriented or focusing on low commitment internationalization strategies such as export and licensing, to be very concentrated and truly global (Lopes, 2007) . In the last decade international acquisitions have increased significantly across the industrial sector and to some degree they replace the strategy of forming joint ventures with local partners (ibid).
However, given the larger commitment and the amount of resources involved, acquisitions are seen as both financially and politically more risky than other entry modes (see e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) . The influence of the wider society on these strategic decisions, such as home country institutional differences and how they affect acquisition behaviour are often neglected or viewed in a deterministic way that eliminates managerial agency. Similarly, discussion of how risk is assessed is viewed as either an expression of changing strategic initiatives (new management or a reaction to dramatic changes in market activity) or the manifestation of a longstanding propensity that is culturally embedded. Both tend to oversimplify the interaction of key processes or the role of imitative behaviour that can occur. This paper argues that acquisition risk is conditional upon institutional features as well as firm ownership structure. By differentiating risk according to key firm characteristics we are able to show how overlapping and reinforcing institutional impacts make a clear difference in shaping risk-taking in large acquisitions. Our paper, therefore, focuses on an issue which has not been systematically explored so far: the comparison of strategic decisions behind large international acquisitions and the role of managerial risk-taking. In order to understand and assess differences in managerial risk-taking, we refer to national specific institutional features of the acquiring company and compare how features of home country specific financial systems influence risk profiles and risk-taking within MNCs. We compare four MNCs that are in the same industrial sector, two originating from liberal market economies with large domestic markets for beer and two originating from coordinated market economies with a small home market.
Analysing acquisition risk-taking: an eclectic review of the literature

Acquisition risks
Acquisitions are in general risky investments compared to other types of market entry such as export, licensing and strategic alliances, as they require a higher level of financial investment. Even compared to greenfield establishments, they incur greater risk due to the high premiums often paid for the target firm. High premiums put further risks on non-reversible investments, such as low divestment price of target firms (Brouthers and Dikova, 2010) . Our first assessment criterion for acquisition risk is, therefore, the premium paid in relation to the share price of the target firm.
The second criterion of acquisition risk is the relative size of the target firm, in terms of amount and quality of resources, in relation to the acquiring firm and the latter's ability to capitalize on the target firm resources. From a resource-based point of view, Penrose's (1959) growth theory predicts that current acquisitive growth is an outcome of previous organic and acquisitive growth. Companies are (or should be) constrained by their amount and quality of resources, where past investments are likely to lead to path dependencies in future strategic action (Teece et al., 1997) . Brouthers and Dikova (2010) express this situation as strategic flexibility, which is provided by past investment in human resources, information systems, financial structures, etc.
Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel (2009) also find that external growth strategies require internal resources, particularly capital and management capacity. Lockett et al. (2011) emphasize that growth constraints are due to adjustment cost, which is the time and efforts used in integrating new managers and operations in expanding the activities of the firm. Further, Nooteboom (1999) emphasizes the need to be able to transfer resources to the 'weak' acquired firm in the form of managers, management systems, knowledge, capital and so forth, in order to replace or renew the consolidated practices of the target firm. The ability to reveal ex-ante synergy opportunities therefore relies on the amount and quality of the acquiring company's resources.Acquisitions of relative large target firms are assessed to be risky when the acquiring company does not have the right amount and quality of resources in place.
An aspect omitted from our analysis is the cultural distances between acquiring and acquired firms. Even though cultural mis-match has been associated with high failure rates of M&A (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999) , cultural distance has also proven to enhance performance, as acquisitions provide access to valuable pools of critical embedded resources and practices otherwise not available to the acquiring firm (Morosoni et al., 1998) . Cultural distance is, therefore, not an acquisition risk per se, but rather an obstacle to reveal ex ante synergies -an obstacle than can be solved by the integration strategy (Schweizer, 2005) .
Influences of institutions: home country and ownership patterns
Acquisition risks can also be assessed from an institutional point of view, although this has been done in a rather limited manner so far (Dunning, 2009 ). Mainly it is in reference to the structure and size of the domestic market and their influence on internationalization approaches of firms as well as the role of national industrial policies for the internationalisation of R&D activities (Narula, 2000) . What has often been ignored is how different kinds of societal institutions govern business activities in ways that encourage firms to develop capabilities that enhance their competitiveness in new and different markets (Whitley, 2007) . Similarly are there circumstances that inhibit foreign acquisition risk-taking? In an attempt to clarify and address this question we distinguish between coordinated and liberal market economies, and relate this to the division between family and concentrated ownership.
Coordinated versus liberal market economies
The role of home country national institutions has only briefly been considered in international management research as being critical to the analysis internationalization strategies (Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003) . The key question here is how differences between societal institutions (e.g. the political, financial, educational and industrial relations systems) influence acquisition strategies of MNCs. It is assumed that national specific institutional characteristics are reflected in strategic managerial decision processes of the MNC because of these actors' socialisation and social embeddedness within their home country society and culture. Implicit here is an understanding of culture whereby shared beliefs and attitudes about what is appropriate to do in particular circumstances is paramount (Hall and Soskice 2001, Whitley 1999 ).
Using a comparative institutionalist perspective we distinguish between two significantly different systems: bank-based financial systems that are typical for coordinated market economies such as Denmark and the Netherlands and marketbased financial systems that are typical for liberal market economies such as the UK and the USA (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) . Both types of market economies match very well with underlying cultural differences such as collectivism/individualism (Hofstede 1980 i ) In contrast to liberal market economies, capital markets in coordinated market economies are less developed, and concentrated forms of ownership are institutionally supported. In coordinated economies banks use ownership stakes to pursue the strategic interests of their clients (firms), compared to shareholders who mainly follow financial interests in order to increase the market value of shares (ibid). The strategic approach of stock market listed firms is often more narrowly focused on financial control of assets; the approach of the latter, however, is much more broadly focused on the company's long-term growth (ibid).
In sum, financial systems in coordinated market economies are characterised as more deeply socially embedded in the national business system with so-called relationship banking a common practice (Whitley, 1999) . This is opposite to companies that have arm lengths relations with banks in liberal market economies, such as the UK or the US. Relationship banking means that banks are strongly involved in lending, supporting long-term commitment which involves having 'softer' measures in place for firms that under-perform or have short-term financial problems (see also Geppert and Martens, 2009 ).
These home country specific institutional differences are mirrored in the beer industry as seen in 
Family versus stock market based ownership forms
Intitutionalist approaches often suffer from the problem of 'oversocialized' agency, leaving no room for strategic choice and managerial decision making (Child, 1972) .
Dealing with this problem, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) propose an 'actor-centred' institutionalist framework that captures the interconnectedness of managerial strategies and societal constraints. Accordingly, it is assumed that societal institutions of liberal market economies encourage 'autonomy' 'to make tough decisions' or to impose hierarchical control in the firm' (ibid, p. 457). Managers in coordinated market economies, however, are seen as more 'committed' because they are dependent on 'firm specific relationships' to owners (ibid, p. 458), which includes banks and families as well as other important stakeholders such as employees and trade unions. These institutional pressures, therefore, affect ownership patterns in the coordinated and liberal market economies. Family ownership is often treated as a "form of European exceptionalism or a political and institutional reluctance to follow the U.S. path of modern capitalism" (James, 2008, p. 1) , despite the fact that family firms are far more common around the world, including in the UK and US and especially in certain sectors, as the brewery industry.
There has been an extensive debate as to whether family owned or stock market listed firms are more efficient and better business models. Some argue that the dominance of the family leads to agency problems, such as poor management and inefficient internationalization approaches (Fernández and Nieto, 2006) ; others challenge agency theory by showing that managers of family firms seem to be better equipped than managers of stock market listed firms to develop sustainable and entrepreneurial management concepts (Zahra, 2003) . Our research concurs with Lopes' (2007) study on the alcoholic beverage industry (spirits, wine and beer) which is consistent with the latter argument stressing that family firms are adept at balancing entrepreneurship with professional management and thus better equipped to take advantage of strategic opportunities than their stock market listed counterparts.
Research Assumptions
Capturing this interconnectedness between home country institutional influences, ownership patterns and managerial risk-taking, our paper assumes the following:
(1) MNCs originating in coordinated market economies tend to have lower risk profiles and apply a more cautious managerial risk-taking approach when it comes to large international acquisitions and post-acquisition strategies. In comparison, managerial risk-taking is higher in MNCs originating in liberal market economies because there is stronger pressure for short-term profits (as indicated by quarterly financial reports) since depressed earnings can lower share prices. Conversely, family owned companies are far less likely to be subject to this pressure as long as owners view short term negative performance as a trade off for longer term financial viability.
(2) Concentrated ownership forms, based on closer social relationships between controlling shareholders, such as banks and families, institutionally support the development of a more moderate risk profile. We believe that concentrated ownership reinforces this tendency, leading to more cautious managerial risktaking in the case of international acquisitions.
(3) Risk profile and managerial risk-taking are high when MNCs pay higher premiums for international acquisitions and when the acquiring firm's pool of resources is likely to constrain an effective integration process and limit the capitalization of ex-ante synergies.
Methodology
Utilising a case study approach, this paper analyses managerial risk-taking in the international acquisition strategies of global breweries. A comparative setting was chosen to increase variance and divergence in data aiming at a better understanding of the specific mechanisms of managerial risk-taking in firms originating from systematically different institutional contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; George and Bennett, 2005) . Based on the national business systems approach (Whitley, 1999) accessed by Lexis-Nexis press retrieval services as well as by visits in the HWWA press archive.
iii In addition to numerous newspaper and magazine articles covering strategic and organizational issues on the four firms studied, selected information from the companies (mostly annual reports) as well as from secondary sources (e,g. Elshof, 2004; Ebneth and Theuvsen, 2007; Dieng et al., 2009 ) was included.
A focus on published secondary data was pursued to avoid strategically manipulative answers that might have been obtained for instance by interviewing company officials on critical issues such as acquisition risks or expected synergies (cf. Salancik and Meindel, 1984) . Typical problems that occur when using published secondary sources were carefully dealt with: in this instance following Scott's (1990) 
Cross-case and -country comparisons
As posited above we expect that the mutually reinforcing influences of country of origin (coordinated vs. liberal market economies) and ownership (family ownership vs. stock market ownership) lead to different risk profiles and managerial risk-taking with regard to international acquisitions. Thus, we assume Heineken and Carlsberg, as two family owned breweries from coordinated market economies that have been pioneers in internationalizing, to operate with a much lower risk profile than A-B and S&N, two stock-market listed companies from large liberal market economies that have tried to catch up in internationalization through acquisitions. We also expect that higher risk profiles are linked with resource constraints, which consequently leads to increased managerial risk-taking in related company cases.
Our analysis focuses on different aspects of acquisition risk-taking, which is: 1) the premium paid for the target firm, 2) ownership influences, and 3) the resource related growth constraints of the firms.
Target firm premium
The premium paid for the target firm is related to the investment risk of the acquisition. The higher the premium being paid, the higher the synergy effects required to make the investment profitable. As a research assumption, we expect that Heineken and Carlsberg would have paid lower premiums than A-B and S&N. Table II about here Looking at the financial data given in table II, which provides a brief overview on the acquisition cases included in our study, the assumption above is supported. On a comparative basis, A-B and S&N paid significantly more for their large acquisitions than Heineken and Carlsberg. Heineken paid on average 1.99 times the multiple of sales (based on data for 3 large acquisitions) whereas Carlsberg only paid 1.30 times the multiple of sales (based on data for 2 large acquisitions). This compares to an average of 2.64 times the sales paid in large deals by S&N and 2.60 by A-B (based on data of each 3 large acquisitions). A similar but somewhat less striking difference between the two groups of companies can be found by looking at the relationship between the deal value and the EBITA (or net profit).
In the case of Heineken, market analysis suggests that the price paid for Austrian BBAG was slightly too high. Despite this, analysts unanimously agreed that the company's strategic positioning and cost savings were optimum (Financial Times Deutschland, May 5, 2003) . Furthermore, compared to the cost of a typical greenfield establishment in Russia, the price paid by Heineken for Bravo was considered as fair by market analysts (Eliassov, 2002) . Regarding Carlsberg's acquisitions, market analysts only reacted on the take-over of German Holsten, assessing it as less promising (Børsen, January 1, 2004; Børsen, February 11, 2004) .
However most of the financial press were shocked when A-B announced a hostile was acquired. The total deal was worth 828 m€ -3.3 times the annual sales volume.
As some analysts noted, this rather high price is only partly justified by the potential of the well known Sagres brand (Financial Times, May 14, 2003) .
Ownership influences
Next we compare differences in risk profile and managerial risk-taking in relation to the differences in ownership structures. We again expect a lower risk profile in the case of family or foundation influence compared to MNCs with dispersed (stock market listed) ownership.
Heineken's cautious acquisition strategy is underpinned by its ownership structure, According to many experts, the rather late and contradictory acquisition strategy of A-B is also a testament to struggles for control within the firm, where members of the founding family have historically wielded more power than their shareholdings (approximately 4% of voting stock) would suggest, and the short-term interests of the capital markets were satisfied for a rather long time from the earnings on the domestic market. The board was conservative over initial overseas expansion, preferring joint
ventures. Yet when A-B's major competitors aggressively expanded into emerging markets, the company followed suit, but without an operational coherence other than that of building market share. Such actions were less motivated by shareholder value concerns than they were by an almost visceral response by the family dominated management structure in the St Louis headquarters. In this sense the company's actions were an immediate response to the behaviour of its competitors; a short term view that would have long term financial repercussions. For many in the business press the managerial actions were deemed irrational and fiscally imprudent, but also seen as reflecting the failure of August Busch III to invest significantly overseas when earlier opportunities arose (Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2008) .
In comparison to the other three cases, the acquisition strategy of S&N was the most open towards the short term profit expectations of analysts and shareholders. This became quite obvious in the firm's behaviour prior to the take-over. Even when the management actively opposed the hostile take-over bid of rivals Heineken and Carlsberg and tried to force Carlsberg legally to sell its stake in BBH to S&N, the CEO, a former City analyst, made it quite clear that -no matter whether S&N or its rivals will win these 'battles'-"either way our shareholders will benefit" (Financial 
Resource related risks
A third aspect of risk-taking in acquisitions is resource related risk that might lead to growth constraints. As discussed earlier, two intertwined factors can make up such growth constraints. The first factor is the amount and quality of resources in the target firm, especially when subsequent substantial investments are needed to increase efficiency and reveal synergy. The second deals with the resources and the experience available at the acquiring firm to deal with such resource mismatch. We will first analyse the cases of Heineken and Carlsberg and show that they took fewer resource related risks and that they could draw on strong historical experience in dealing with such risks. This is followed by an analysis of A&B and S&N, where strong resource related acquisition risks were aggravated by missing resources, political will and experience in dealing with such risks.
All three acquisition targets of Heineken met criteria for efficiently run breweries. (Glamann, 1997) . Based on these experiences
Carlsberg was able to integrate the three larger acquisitions studied here. Okocim was upgraded through large investments in capacity and modernization of production assets (Carlsberg Annual Report, 2006) . Furthermore, the number of production sites had been reduced from four to three, packaging sites from 12 to seven, and warehouses from 12 to six (Koudal and Engel, 2007) . The rather successful integration of Okocim is also demonstrated by the fact that it has gained an international mandate despite initial plans of Carlsberg to replace the local brand with Carlsberg's international brands (Meyer and Tran, 2006) . Thus the Okocim brand has been launched in the UK (targeting the 600,000 Polish inhabitants in Britain (Grocer, March 11, 2006; Marketing Week, June 28, 2007) and India (Business Today, October, 21, 2007) . In respect to Feldschlösschen strong restructuring efforts (e.g., significant investments in production) were made, the number of breweries was reduced, and wine and mineral water businesses were divested. These three acquisitions appeared to many in the financial press to be more of a reaction to other major foreign brewers' international strategies than a carefully thought out plan by A-B. While Grupo Modelo made sense given the growth in consumption of its core beers (Corona and Corona Light) in the US and the existing marketing relationship between the two companies, the latter two acquisitions were expensive and contradictory (Harbin and Tsingtao were major competitors with each other) and made in a hyper competitive, cost driven market (Heracleous, 2001 ).
Additionally, it wasn't clear what plans A-B had for the combined company, how the newly acquired assets would fit with its existing relationship with Tsingtao (Financial Times, June 29, 2005) , and how such risky foreign acquisitions would be integrated and thus create synergies with A-B's core business in the large US home market.
Overall, a misfit with regard to the quality of resources in the target companies was accompanied by a lack of strategic foresight and experience in international postacquisition integration.
Originating from a large and protected beer market, it was not before the turn of the millennium that S&N seriously entered foreign markets (e.g. Table III provides an overview of our key findings. Our initial research assumption that Heineken and Carlsberg display lower risk profiles in large acquisitions abroad than A-B and S&N is broadly confirmed. We also found some support for the underlying relationship assumptions. The companies from small home countries (Heineken and Carlsberg) internationalized from the outset. Since further growth often was only possible abroad, these firms developed a rather strong position outside their home country over decades. In both cases, the owning family (Heineken) or Foundation (Carlsberg) directly vetoed acquisitions that seemed too risky and made certain that management followed a rather long-term approach, engaging in large take-overs only when they were financially and strategically sound. This due diligence also shows up in their better strategic capability to create synergies between the acquired target firms and other business units of the companies, which was missing in cases of A-B and S&N. Finally, Heineken and Carlsberg display a much lower reliance on capital markets in their financing than A-B and S&N (see Table I ), thus sheltering managerial risk-taking from short term profit maximizing pressure from capital markets.
Discussion
This pressure was most evident in the case of S&N, where management was pushed into a rather high risk strategy with regard to large acquisitions. We found reinforcing influences of the short-termist capital market (home country influence) leading to high 'speed' (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002 ) and thus risky large acquisitions which made it difficult for the management to learn and develop the company into a sustainable and independent global player within the beer industry. Our research also confirms the findings of an earlier comparative study on managerial decision-making styles (Axelsson et al., 1991) which stresses that strategic decisions in British firms are made quicker because participants show relatively low commitment, in comparison to their Swedish counterparts. Managerial decision-making in coordinated market environments requires more negotiation, which leads to both longer decision times and stronger managerial commitment.
A-B is the company, with the highest percentage (98.6%) of shares listed on the stock market of our four cases (see Table I ). However, the firm's dominant position in the domestic market and its foray into internationalization largely structured around joint ventures left it somewhat unwilling to recognise the benefits of international acquisitions and then exposed its lack of experience when it finally did commit to such a strategy. Not surprisingly the 'irregularity' of this strategic approach is negatively related to performance, as Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) have argued.
However, the effects of the capital market on international acquisition strategies and Analyzing the particular risk profiles of the companies, Heineken and Carlsberg show a strong concern for the financial exposure they incur with large acquisitions, carefully select targets aimed at a strategic fit and devote many managerial efforts to the rationalization, modernization and integration of the acquired firms. In comparison, A-B and S&N played catch-up in internationalization. The result is that they incurred rather high financial risks, missed an optimal strategic fit and overstrained their organizations with a large burden of integration tasks, for which they lacked both experience and capacity.
To sum up, with an increase in the pace of consolidation in the global beer market after the turn of the millennium, including more and more large and very large acquisitions, companies with a strong history of internationalization and a strong influence of family or foundation ownership seem to survive and prosper (Carlsberg and Heineken). In contrast, companies with comparatively little international experience and a rather dispersed ownership (A-B, S&N) made less fiscally prudent acquisitions and ended up as take-over targets.
Concluding remarks
Our paper sheds light on current debates about the future of 'shareholder value capitalism' and the problems firms face if they are highly dependent on capital markets. Comparing the acquisition strategy of four major players in the brewery industry, we found that stock market pressures led to more risky acquisition profiles by MNCs originating from liberal market economies.
Moreover, our research confirms earlier research findings (Lopes, 2007; Lewis, 2001) that successful global players apply a risk-taking approach which carefully combines entrepreneurship and professional management. However, based on the findings of this study we add that this is not only an indicator of the importance of family ownership within this sector, but also of the role of home country specific forms of corporate financing and effective management of resources for the acquiring firm, especially in both the acquisition and the post-acquisition phase.
Our analysis has also shown that eclectic application of conceptual ideas can be a useful approach to analyse the behaviour of management in MNCs. Such an approach has been fruitfully applied earlier by scholars such as Dunning (1988) Ferner, 1997; Geppert et al., 2003) or internationalization patterns (Rugman 2005) , but has missed out on looking at acquisitions, which have been observed as the dominant mode of internationalization over the past two decades (UNCTAD 2010).
Next to the fact that the country of origin matters to understand managerial risk-taking in international acquisitions, our paper proved that concentrated ownership patterns have reinforcing effects on managerial risk-taking in MNCs which originate from coordinated market economies to adopt more long-term and sustainable strategies when selecting and integrating newly acquired firms. Our empirical findings reveal significant path-dependencies related to historically grown societal institutions and ownership patterns, especially in the cases of Heineken and S&N. However, our findings also show the role of social agency. In the cases of A-B and Carlsberg, powerful social actors--the family in the case of A-B and powerful shareholders in the case of Carlsberg --and their interests had a moderating influence on expected path dependencies. To better elucidate these moderating effects is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this study and requires more in-depth research. Finally, because of the strong oligopolistic structure of the global brewery industry, studying the four leading companies affirms the representative nature of our findings for the global brewery industry. Future research needs to apply our research question in other industries and cross-sectoral comparisons. 
